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Abstract
We investigate performance effects for China’s listed firms when there is a change in the
controlling shareholder. These changes include ownership transfers from one state entity
to another state entity and from a state entity to a private entity. We find positive perfor-
mance effects when control is passed to a private entity. In contrast, when the transfer is
made to another branch of the state, there is little change in performance. The stock market
responds positively to a change in control, with the largest effect observed for private trans-
fers. Our results suggest the Chinese government should continue to sell down its share
ownership in listed firms as the transfer of control to private owners enhances corporate
profitability and efficiency. Moreover, to help ownership reform, China should encourage
an active market for corporate control.
I. Introduction
China’s rapid transformation toward a market economy has been well docu-
mented. While impressive growth rates have been recorded in the national econ-
omy (Jefferson, Rawski, Wang, and Zhang (2000), Rawski (1994)), the corporate
sector has not achieved the successes expected of it. In particular, company prof-
itability and efficiency have shown little or no improvement and some studies
suggest there has been a decline in performance from pre-listing to post-listing
(Chen, Firth, and Rui (1999)).
One reason postulated for the lack of an improvement in corporate perfor-
mance after listing is that the controlling ownership often resides in the state1
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1In China, the state and government entities typically retain substantial ownership of the firm and
in this sense the privatization is partial; however, to ease exposition we use the term privatization
rather than partial privatization.
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and so any impetus for radical reform from the privatization is muted. Here, the
old bureaucratic ways of state-owned enterprise (SOE) management remain and
there is a lukewarm reception for modern management and governance methods
(Chen, Firth, and Rui (2006)). Eventually, China’s rulers came to recognize that
the SOE reforms have not had the desired effect and that further ownership re-
form is needed. To encourage ownership reform, the government now allows the
controlling ownership stake in a privatized firm to be sold; the buyer can be an-
other state entity or a private individual or firm. Approvals for control transfers
have so far been given for more than 25% of firms and they have resulted in a
major shakeup of corporate ownership. The purpose of this study is to examine
the nature and impact of changes in controlling shareholders in China.
Our study uses a number of methods to examine the real gains and efficiency
improvements that result from control transfers. We argue that the efficiency gains
from control transfers differ depending on the type of new controlling shareholder.
In particular, we expect that performance improvements will be more pronounced
when the controlling ownership of firms passes into the hands of a private entity
as this helps align the cash flow rights with the control rights of the investor.
Moreover, private investors often assume a hands-on role in managing the firm
and so the manager-owner agency conflicts are less severe. We find that when
ownership is transferred to private hands, profitability and efficiency improve.
We further find that increases in profitability are mainly due to cost savings and
a reduction in the labor force. In contrast, state transfers show little improvement
in firm performance.
We also find that frequent transfers of controlling ownership are detrimental
to performance, changes in CEO are beneficial, and industry shifts have posi-
tive effects. Changes in CEO and industry shifts are more likely when control
is passed to a private entity. Positive stock returns are observed in the period
leading up to the control transfer and these gains are maintained in the 60 days
thereafter. The gains are higher for private transfers. Long-term positive stock
returns are observed for control transfers and these are greater for those firms that
have subsequent performance improvements.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides
evidence on the importance of ownership structure in facilitating performance
changes in a socialist-market setting. While there are extensive studies on the mar-
ket for corporate control (Denis and McConnell (2003)), they principally relate to
the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, the U.K., Canada, Europe, and Australia, and
these economies are very different from China’s. Because we focus on changes in
ownership, our study avoids the endogeneity problem that exists in many studies
of firm performance and ownership structure (Holderness (2002)).
Second, we contribute to the privatization literature (e.g., Dewenter and Mala-
testa (2001), Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999), Megginson and Netter
(2001), and Shleifer (1998)). A number of approaches to privatization have been
adopted throughout the developing world and China’s unique gradualist approach
stands in contrast to the abrupt ownership changes used in Russia and Eastern
Europe (Chen et al. (2006)). Ownership changes that take place after the initial
privatization and IPO listing have received little attention in previous research and
so our study sheds some light on this important feature of enterprise reform.
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Third, we extend the limited China-based research by using both accounting
numbers and stock returns to measure performance, and we investigate reasons
for changes in performance. In contrast, other studies on ownership change in
China rely exclusively on accounting data (Wang and Wong (2003)) or exclusively
on stock price data (Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2003)). Further, Wang and Wong
(2003) and Berkman et al. (2003) focus solely on transfers from government to
state enterprises, whereas we include transfers to state enterprises and private
enterprises.
There are a number of studies that have examined the performance of Chi-
nese IPOs (e.g., Chen et al. (1999), (2006), Sun and Tong (2003), Wang (2005),
and Wei, Varela, D’Souza, and Hassan (2003)). IPO firms raise new equity capi-
tal but the dominant stockholder is the same as before the listing. In our study of
control transfers (i.e., where there is a change in the major blockholder), no new
equity capital is raised and the firms have already exited the IPO period and have
been subject to capital market discipline. Thus, our study is quite different from
the IPO studies.
Section II of the paper briefly reviews China’s privatization program and the
subsequent transfer of ownership control. This section also explores the economic
effects of different types of control transfers. The sample and research design are
discussed in Section III, which is then followed by a description of the results in
Section IV. Conclusions are presented in the final section.
II. Ownership and Control Transfer of China’s Listed Firms
A. China’s Economic Reforms
China’s economic reforms have, publicly at least, embraced the Western
mantras of maximizing profitability, improving efficiency, and increasing man-
agers’ decision making powers and autonomy. At the same time, however, China
has wanted to maintain ultimate control of the economy. These aims combine to
create what the authorities call a socialist-market economy (Lin and Zhu (2000)).
The effectiveness of the socialist-market system is an open question. Aivazian,
Ge, and Qiu (2005) examine the corporatization of SOEs and conclude that this
brings about an improvement in performance. They attribute this improvement
in performance to changes in monitoring (by setting up board committees) and
a reduction in the influence of the Communist Party in the appointment of man-
agers. Note that corporatization involves reorganizing the SOE as an enterprise
with share capital and a board of directors, but all the shares are still owned by
the government. Aivazian et al. (2005) do not examine the privatization of SOEs
where shares are sold to non-state investors and listed on the stock market. How-
ever, privatization has been examined in other studies (e.g., Chen et al. (1999),
(2006)).
The vast majority of listed firms were formed from SOEs or selected divi-
sions of SOEs, and, in most cases, the state retained a controlling ownership stake
immediately after the listing. The state’s ownership is held by a state ministry,
local or regional government, or State Asset Management Bureaus (SAMB). By
controlling stake, we mean the largest shareholder as, in China, this means having
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effective control (Berkman et al. (2003), Tenev and Zhang (2002)). For example,
Xu (2004) shows that the largest stockholder owns, on average, 46% of a firm’s
shares while the second largest stockholder owns 7% (the respective medians are
46% and 4%). With such a large ownership stake, the largest shareholder is able
to appoint a firm’s directors and top managers, and is able to exert considerable
influence on the firm’s activities. Immediately after the listing, the controlling
stockholder is invariably connected to the state (a state ministry or a parent SOE).
B. Changes in Ownership Control
Chen et al. (1999) demonstrate that the profitability and efficiency of firms
has actually fallen after listing and they suggest that ownership reform is needed
to turn things around. The Chinese government has also recognized the weak per-
formance of many listed firms and has acknowledged that ownership reform is a
likely way to remedy the situation. The state has, therefore, allowed its controlling
stakes in firms to be diluted by selling its ownership interests to other investors.
This policy was enunciated in a SAMB directive Implementing Opinion on the
Management of State Ownership Rights in Shareholding Experiment Companies
(issued on March 11, 1994).
The first control transfer took place in 1994 when Hengtong Group Co., a
SOE, acquired 35.5% of the state’s shareholding in Shanghai LengGuang In-
dustrial Co., a listed firm. The transfer was negotiated between the parties, ap-
proval was obtained from the central authorities, and Hengtong paid cash to the
state shareholder. Hengtong Group Co. became the largest shareholder in Shang-
hai LengGuang Industrial Co. and was therefore able to exert significant influ-
ence over the board of directors and top management via direct representation
on the board. In our terminology, control of Shanghai LengGuang Industrial Co.
changed from the state to the Hengtong Group Co. Subsequent control transfers
were few and far between until 1996, when the state became more aware of the
need for ownership change. In most cases, it is the state that is relinquishing
control although in very recent years (since 2001) there have been examples of
private investors selling controlling stakes.
Three main types of control transfers are observed in China. First, there is
a controlling ownership that is transferred to another unit of the state and which
is typically overseen by the same ministry. No cash changes hands in these trans-
actions and so we call them “cost-free” transfers. These transfers are usually an
administrative arrangement and they are not expected to have any significant im-
pact on the performance of a firm. For this reason, we do not include these types
of transfers in our study. In supplementary tests, we carry out analyses of cost-free
transfers and the results confirm that cost-free transfers do not lead to significant
changes in performance. The other two main types of control transfer, and the
ones that are the focus of this study, involve bargaining between the buying and
selling parties so as to determine the exact sale price, and the purchaser pays cash
to the seller to complete the transaction. The cash transactions are split into those
where shares are sold to another state-owned or controlled entity (and are termed
state transfers), and those where shares are sold to a private entity (and are termed
private transfers).
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When a company first lists on the stock market, about 64% of its shares
are in the hands of the founders (who are typically state institutions including
SOEs). The other 36% of the shares are offered to the public, and these are
called individual shares. Founders’ shares and individual shares rank equally as
regards voting and dividends. However, it is only the shares sold to individuals
that are tradable on the two stock exchanges (the Shanghai Stock Exchange and
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange). Founder’s shares, more commonly called state
shares and legal entity shares, can be transferred, but this requires permission
from the authorities (such as the SAMB and the Ministry of Finance). Transfer
of control effectively means the founder needs to be the seller as it is virtually
impossible to buy a controlling interest via the tradable shares. To become the
largest shareholder by buying tradable shares would mean the company would
lose its listing as there would be too few remaining tradable shares in the hands
of the public. When a party buys shares from the founders, these shares remain
non-tradable. Thus, controlling stakes in listed firms are made up of non-tradable
shares (even if they are owned by a private investor).
When non-tradable shares are sold, the transfer price is the result of bargain-
ing and negotiation between the parties. However, the transfer price generally has
some relation to the net asset value of the firm, rather than the market price of the
tradable shares.2 Tradable shares generally have high price-earnings ratios and
stock prices are at a considerable premium to the net asset value (Poon, Firth, and
Fung (1998)). In developed markets, control blocks are typically traded at a pre-
mium because the private benefits of control are very valuable. In sharp contrast,
the purchase and sale of control stakes in China are done at a significant discount
to the market price. Because the shares are not convertible into tradable shares,3
there is no possibility of making an immediate windfall profit by selling them in
the stock market.
C. Sources of Gains from Transfer of Control
The state has been concerned about the abject performance of many firms af-
ter their listing, and they believe one remedy is to allow other firms (or individual
investors) to take over control. This is considered preferable to either bankruptcy
or providing subsidies to keep the firm afloat. Allowing a transfer of control is
done in the hope that the new owner will inject superior management and more
efficient operations into the ailing listed firm.
Control transfers can help facilitate the replacement of incompetent man-
agers and this can lead to an improvement in performance. When firms first list,
the senior management and board of directors are often the incumbents from be-
fore listing and they owe their appointments to political patronage, seniority, and
service to the Chinese Communist Party. The incumbent managers have estab-
lished relations with the initial controlling shareholder and they often become
2In practice, net assets per share is the base price when trading parties bargain. This practice
follows the policy enunciated in Regulatory Opinion on State Ownership Rights Implementation by
Owners of Joint Stock Companies (1997). The policy opinion requires that the share transfer price
should be primarily based on net assets per share.
3In June 2005, there were changes to the regulations to allow state and legal shares to be converted
into tradable shares. This change is described in Section IV.E.
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entrenched and complacent. Incentive systems are weak and executive stock op-
tions are a rarity (Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006a)). Entrenchment and the lack of
incentives leads to significant agency problems between the managers and the
owners and these problems severely undermine the profitability and efficiency of
state-controlled listed firms. Control transfers typically lead to the replacement of
the existing management.
We believe it is important to distinguish between state and private transfers
as the new controlling owners have different motivations, which affect the level
of monitoring and discipline they exert on the listed firm. In state transfers, the
change of control does not necessarily alleviate the agency problems inherent
in state-controlled firms. The new controlling shareholder is typically a 100%
government-owned SOE, and the bureaucrats who run SOEs are civil servants
who owe their positions to party affiliation and political favor. The new control-
ling shareholder may not be able to enjoy the cash flows from its investments.
The dividends paid by the listed firm (to the controlling shareholder) often end up
in the government’s or ministry’s coffers. In these circumstances, the new con-
trolling shareholder has less motivation (vis-a`-vis private investors) to bring about
performance improvements at the listed firm.
In private transfers, agency problems between managers and owners are mit-
igated. A private owner enjoys cash flow rights from its investments and so it
has incentives to press listed firms to improve performance. Large private con-
trolling shareholders typically participate in the listed firm’s management and
this can help effect change. These factors help resolve incentive problems and
alleviate agency problems resulting from the separation of ownership from con-
trol. The early research of Alchain (1965), Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996),
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), Shleifer (1998), and others argues that privati-
zation of SOEs is more effective when ownership and control are transferred to
private hands. For example, government interference in the running of a private-
controlled firm is likely to be less than in a state-controlled firm. Based on this
literature, we believe that a private transfer will lead to greater improvement (vis-
a`-vis a state transfer) in a firm’s performance.
We acknowledge, however, that there are dissenting views on the efficacy
of transfers to SOEs and private investors. For example, Qian (2001) cautions
that the dominant shareholders may siphon off the firm’s assets and engage in
practices that expropriate value from the firm. He argues that under weak law
enforcement, minority shareholders are better protected when the government is
the controlling shareholder. Thus, private controlling investors may be more likely
to expropriate a listed firm’s resources away from the minority shareholders than
are government-controlled firms.
In a private transfer, the new controlling shareholder sometimes injects its
private businesses into the listed firm. In some cases, this can amount to a “back
door” listing. Because the state has strict quotas on firms making IPOs, obtaining
a controlling shareholding in an existing listed company is oftentimes the fastest
and most convenient way to obtain a much coveted stock market listing. Under
the government policy that the stock market will serve as a catalyst for the reform
of SOEs, the government, which controls the scale and approval procedure of
IPOs, intentionally favors the listing of SOEs (or the commercial activities of the
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SEOs). Private firms that wish to list have lower priority than SOEs and so they
may try to speed up the process of listing by taking control of an already listed
former SOE. Injecting a private firm’s assets into a listed firm can lead to a change
in the firm’s industry classification (i.e., the firm changes its industry).
III. Research Design
A. Sample Data
Control transfers are identified when listed companies announce a change of
largest shareholder due to negotiated purchases. The PRC Company Law (1993)
makes control transfers legitimate and the first example occurred in 1994. How-
ever, transfers did not become frequent until 1996 and so our study is confined
to transfers that are announced in the five-year period 1996–2000. The sample
data are obtained first by checking the periodic reports of listed companies to
identify changes in the largest shareholder. These data are verified by searching
related announcements made by listed firms in the following newspapers: China
Securities, Securities Times, and Shanghai Securities. Supplemental sources of
information include company websites, magazine articles, and information from
the State Assets Supervisory Commission (SASAC). According to the laws and
regulations, a change of ownership to 5% or above should be reported to the stock
exchange and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) immediately,
and then should be made public. The CSRC is the regulator for the securities in-
dustry. Required disclosures include detailed statements on a change of largest
shareholder. The announcement date, share transfer price, transaction size, and
other transaction-specific information are hand collected from the company’s an-
nouncements.
Detailed investigations are made to identify the ultimate controlling share-
holder. This investigative process became easier in 2001 when listed firms in-
creased their disclosures on controlling shareholders. In many cases, we are able
to work back from data in 2001 to determine (or to verify) the true identity of the
new controlling shareholder. This procedure involves working back through cor-
porate pyramids, which are a feature of some listed firms (Fan, Wong, and Zhang
(2005)). After identifying the ultimate controlling shareholders, we partition them
into state transfers and private transfers. The stock return data and financial state-
ment data are obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research
Database (CSMAR).
Table 1 shows the distribution of control transfers by year, listing exchange,
and type. In total, there are 156 control transfers of non-financial listed compa-
nies, 94 to state entities and 62 to private entities. We also identify another 33
negotiated control transfers, but we are unable to identify the ultimate controlling
shareholder and thus we cannot categorize them as state or private. Therefore, we
do not include these 33 cases in our analyses. The listed firms are evenly split
between the two stock exchanges. Twelve firms experience more than one control
transfer during the period of our study. The results we report in the paper use all
156 control transfers. However, when we omit the multiple events we find similar
results to those shown in the paper.
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TABLE 1
Distribution of Sample Control Transfers of China’s Listed Companies 1996–2000
Table 1 reports the distribution of sample control transfers of China’s listed companies by year, type of buyers, and stock
exchange. In this study, a control transfer takes place when a listed company announces a change of largest shareholder
due to a negotiated purchase. We omit finance and insurance companies. The columns “SHSE” and “SZSE” refer to the
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, respectively, where control transferred companies list their
shares. “State Transfers” refers to those cases where both the sellers and the buyers are state entities, while “Private
Transfers” refers to transfers where private firms buy control from state entities.
All Transfers State Transfers Private Transfers
Year SHSE SZSE Sum SHSE SZSE Sum SHSE SZSE Sum
1996 3 6 9 2 2 4 1 4 5
1997 11 14 25 8 9 17 3 5 8
1998 30 16 46 16 12 28 14 4 18
1999 17 27 44 9 16 25 8 11 19
2000 16 16 32 11 9 20 5 7 12
Total 77 79 156 46 48 94 31 31 62
Table 2 shows selected descriptive statistics of the transfers and the listed
firms. On average, the share transfer involves 30.54% (mean) and 28.04% (me-
dian) of a listed firm’s shares. The percentage of shares involved is statistically
similar for state transfers and for private transfers. The transfer price is approx-
imately 14% higher than the net asset value per share (the median transfer price
is 2.30 renminbi (RMB) whereas the median net asset value is 2.02 RMB) and,
on average, is at a 73% discount to the prevailing market price. Firms involved
with state transfers are much larger than firms involved with private transfers (the
mean market capitalization of firms involved in control transfers to state investors
is 1.62 billion RMB whereas the mean value of firms sold to private investors is
1.00 billion RMB). Based on operating return on assets (ROA), firms involved
with private transfers have much lower profitability prior to the transfer (mean =
−0.23%, median = 0.52%) than firms with state transfers (mean = 1.51%, median
= 1.75%). The evidence is consistent with the state encouraging poorly perform-
ing listed firms to be “taken over” by a private firm (by takeover, we mean a
change of the largest shareholder rather than a transfer of more than 50% of the
shares). Note that we do not have direct evidence on the profitability of the pri-
vate firm as such information is not disclosed. Based on anecdotal evidence, we
believe the private firm is profitable.
Table 2 also shows the future capital issues made by the sample firms in
the three years after the control transfer. Rights offers and placements are usually
made at a discount to the market value, but are priced much higher than the net as-
set value. Rights issues are more common although placements raise more funds
per issue. The frequency of SEOs (rights offers and placements) is similar to the
population of all listed firms. Control transfer firms are, therefore, no more likely
to make SEOs than other companies. About 20% of private control transfer firms
make an SEO in the three years after the transfer. The ability to raise additional
capital is one reason why private investors might want to take control of a listed
firm. The number of SEOs made by control transfer firms is limited as the CSRC
requires firms to make profits and a 10% return on equity in the two or three years
prior (Chen and Yuan (2004)) and, as we show in Table 2, firms have poor prof-
itability in the years before the transfer. The new controlling shareholder has to
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics on Control Transfers and Control Transferred Companies
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of control transfers and firm characteristics of the control transferred companies for
the whole sample and for the subgroups. “Transfer Price” is the price per share the buyers pay to the sellers. “Stock
Price” is the stock price for control transferred firms. “Discount” is calculated by 1 minus the ratio of transfer price to
stock price. “Percentage of Shares Transferred” is the percentage of the number of shares transferred to the total number
of shares at the date of control transfer. “Number of shares transferred” is the total number of shares transferred in the
transaction. “Number of Total Shares” refers to the total shares issued by the control transferred companies. “Percentage
of Non-Tradable Shares” refers to the percentage of non-tradable shares to the total shares issued. “Market Capitalization”
is the product of the stock price and the total number of shares issued by the control transferred firm. “Book Value of Total
Assets” is the book value of the control transferred companies’ assets. “Market Value of Total Assets” is the sum of the
market capitalization and the book value of debt. “Net Assets per Share” is the control transferred firm’s book value of
equity divided by total number of shares issued. Operating ROA is the control transferred company’s operating earnings
deflated by the market value of their total assets. “Amount Raised by Rights Offerings” is the funds received from rights
issues made in the three years after a control transfer. “Amount Raised by Placements” is the funds raised from placements
made in the three years after a control transfer. The number of the observations available is reported under the column
“N.” For rights issues and placements, N is the number of firms making rights issues and placements.
All Control Transfers State Transfers Private Transfers
Items N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
Transfer Price (in RMB per share) 131 2.43 2.30 78 2.38 2.17 53 2.52 2.41*
Stock Price (in RMB per share)a 156 9.41 8.68 94 9.89 9.12 62 8.69* 8.20
Discount (1− Transfer Price/Stock Price) 131 0.71 0.73 78 0.72 0.73 53 0.70 0.72
Percentage of Shares Transferred (%) 156 30.54 28.04 94 31.25 28.13 62 29.46 27.85
Number of Shares Transferred (in million) 156 46.14 33.97 94 52.49 38.28 62 36.50* 30.65
Number of Total Shares (in million)a 156 153.22 121.30 94 168.45 123.16 62 130.14* 120.79
Percentage of Non-Tradable Sharesa 156 63.44 65.13 94 64.63 66.75 62 61.64 61.46
Market Capitalization (in RMB 1000 million)a 151 1.37 0.99 91 1.62 1.17 60 1.00*** 0.84***
Book Value of Total Assets (in RMB 1000 million)b 151 0.66 0.46 91 0.74 0.49 60 0.54** 0.44
Market Value of Total Assets (in RMB 1000 million)b 151 1.70 1.21 91 1.99 1.34 60 1.28*** 1.06**
Net Assets per Share (in RMB)b 151 2.07 2.02 91 2.12 2.05 60 1.99 1.89
Operating ROA (%)c 140 0.80 1.02 83 1.51 1.75 57 −0.23*** 0.52**
Amount Raised by Rights Offerings (in RMB million) 41 271.5 217.9 29 280.6 159.8 12 249.6 248.6
Amount Raised by Placements (in RMB million) 10 648.8 662.5 7 631.8 645.0 3 688.4 680.0
a indicates the item is measured at the time control transfers occur; b indicates the item is measured at the beginning
of the control transfer year; c indicates the item is measured by taking the pre-2 year average. ***, ** and * indicate the
private transfers group is statistically different from state transfers group at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
work hard to improve a firm’s profitability if it wants the firm to raise additional
capital.
B. Explaining Discounts
Table 2 shows that the transaction prices of control transfers are, on average,
about 14% higher than the net asset value and about 73% lower than the market
price. However, there is variability in these statistics and so there is no fixed
formula for determining the sale price of the shares. To explain the variability in
discounts, we adapt the model of Chen and Xiong (2001),4 who, in turn, draw
on the earlier work of Longstaff (1995), (2001) and Silber (1991). We use the
characteristics of the firm and the percentage of shares transferred to explain the
discount. The model is:
Discounti = α0 + α1IAROAi + α2SIZEi + α3B/Mi + α4RISKi(1)
+ α5BLOCKi + α6STATEi + α7GROWTHi + α8AGEi + εi.
4Chen and Xiong (2001) examine discounts using data from auctions and private sales of restricted
stock (state and legal shares). The data are from 2001 and are mainly the sale of small investment
stakes (and not controlling stakes). The focus of their paper is different from ours.
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IAROA is the average operating return on assets of the control transfer firm in the
two years prior to the transfer less the average operating return on assets of the
median firm in the same industry. More profitable firms (high IAROA) should
have higher share prices, but the net asset value may not be affected (e.g., if there
is a high dividend payout); this implies a positive sign on IAROA. SIZE is the
log of market value of the firm and is a proxy for its creditworthiness (Chen and
Xiong (2001)). B/M is the book to market ratio. We expect a negative coefficient
on B/M as the transfer price is usually near to the book value of the firm. RISK is
the standard deviation of the 36 monthly stock returns (from month−39 to month
−4) before the control transfer. Based on the arguments of Longstaff (2001),
we expect a positive relation between the discount and RISK. BLOCK is the
percentage of shares that are transferred. A high percentage of shares transferred
will give more control to the buyer who may be willing to pay a higher transfer
price and hence the discount will be lower. STATE is the percentage of shares that
are not tradable (i.e., the state and legal person shares). Firms with a lot of non-
tradable shares may have more government interference (Chen et al. (2006)) and
the tradable shares may be less marketable (Chen and Xiong (2001)); this could
lead to higher discounts. GROWTH is the sales growth in the two years prior to
transfer. High growth firms may elicit higher transfer prices and, hence, lower
discounts. AGE is the number of years between the IPO and the control transfer
year. According to Chen and Xiong (2001), AGE is a proxy for the commercial
viability of the firm and so there should be a negative relation between discount
and AGE.
The results of the regression are shown in Table 3. The R-squares are rela-
tively high although most of the explanatory power comes from just one variable,
the B/M ratio. The negative and significant sign on B/M is consistent with our
expectation; the transfer price is based, in large part, on the book value of the firm.
There is a positive coefficient on SIZE although it is only significant for private
transfers. Thus, the discounts for private transfers are greater for large size firms.
The other variables are not statistically significant. When we substitute MAROA
(matched firm-adjusted ROA) for IAROA, the results are qualitatively the same.
We also use total assets and total sales as measures of SIZE, but the results are
similar to those when we use market value.
C. Performance Measures
Our research design involves comparing performance measures before and
after the control transfer in order to see if the transfer has had any impact. The per-
formance measures we use are operating return on assets (ROA), operating cash
flows to assets (OCF), return on sales (ROS), asset turnover (AT), cost to sales
(CGS), capital expenditure to fixed assets (CAPEX), employment (EMP), sales
per employee (SEMP), assets per employee (AEMP), and sales growth (GRO).
These measures of performance have been widely used in the literature (Dewen-
ter and Malatesta (2001), Chen et al. (2006)). The calculation of performance
measures is as follows.
t indexes the year, t = −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, 3. Most items used to calculate op-
erating performance measures are taken directly from financial statements. Fol-
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TABLE 3
Explanation of the Discounts in Control Transfers of China’s Listed Companies 1996–2000
Discounti = α0 + α1IAROAi + α2SIZEi + α3B/Mi + α4RISKi
+ α5BLOCKi + α6STATEi + α7GROWTHi + α8AGEi + εi .
Discounti is calculated as (1 – Transfer Price/Stock Price). IAROAi is the average industry median-adjusted ROA for the
2 years prior to control transfer. ROAi is calculated using operating earnings deflated by the market value of total assets.
SIZEi is the log of beginning market capitalization for control transferred firms. B/Mi is the book to market ratio calculated
at the beginning of the year. RISKi is the standard deviation of 36 monthly stock returns from month −39 to month −4
(before control transfer). BLOCKi is the percentage of shares transferred in the transaction. STATEi is the percentage of
shares that are not tradable on the stock exchanges. GROWTHi is the sales growth for the 2 years prior to control transfer.
AGEi is the number of years between the control transfer year and the IPO year.
Predicted Signs All Transfers State Transfers Private Transfers
Independent Variable: Discount
Constant ? 0.938 −0.705 0.996 0.382 0.863 −1.907
(0.000) (0.112) (0.000) (0.511) (0.000) (0.009)
IAROA + −0.108 0.245 −0.661
(0.781) (0.716) (0.152)
SIZE − 0.184 0.081 0.294
(0.000) (0.188) (0.000)
B/M − −0.956 −0.959 −1.152 −1.195 −0.701 −0.696
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RISK + −0.151 −0.191 −0.051
(0.390) (0.425) (0.857)
BLOCK − −0.032 −0.146 0.158
(0.677) (0.122) (0.291)
STATE + 0.000 −0.001 0.002
(0.574) (0.536) (0.152)
GROWTH − −0.011 0.005 −0.008
(0.474) (0.898) (0.669)
AGE − −0.003 0.004 −0.009
(0.566) (0.589) (0.349)
Obs. 131 131 78 78 53 53
Model F -Statistics 99.529 16.746 92.843 13.448 21.572 6.020
Adjusted R2 0.441 0.523 0.554 0.598 0.292 0.461
p-values for the coefficients are reported in brackets. Bold signifies a significant coefficient at the 0.05 level or better.
Measures Definitions
Profitability ROAt : Operating Earningst /Market Value of Total Assetst−1
OCF t : Operating Cash Flowst /Market Value of Total Assetst−1
ROSt : Operating Earningst /Net Salest
Operating Efficiency AT t : Net Salest /Average Book Value of Total Assetst
CGSt : Cost of Goods Soldt /Net Salest
Capital Investment CAPEXt : Capital Expenditure/Fixed Assetst−1
Employment EMPt : Number of Employeest
Productivity SEMPt : Net Salest /Number of Employeest
AEMPt : Book Value of Total Assetst /Number of Employeest
Growth GROt : (Salest − Salest−1)/Salest−1
lowing Ghosh (2001), operating cash flow is defined as sales minus cost of good
sold, minus selling and administrative expenses, plus depreciation and amortiza-
tion expenses. Similar to Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) and Ghosh (2001),
we use the market value of assets as the scalar for profitability. The market value
of assets is the market capitalization of the firm (market price times the number
of shares) plus the book value of debt. As sensitivity tests, we use other scalars
for profitability. These alternatives are market value of the listed shares plus the
book value of non-tradable shares plus the book value of debt; book value of total
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assets; and book value of net assets (shareholders’ equity). The results from using
these alternatives are qualitatively the same as when using the market value of
assets.
We use operating earnings rather than net income because the latter mea-
sure is prone to manipulation (Chen and Yuan (2004)). Employee numbers are
collected from annual reports. However, it is only since 1999 that listed firms
have been required to disclose the number of employees in their annual reports.
Therefore, we have a smaller sample size for analyses that use employment data
and employee productivity data. We also use stock returns as a measure of per-
formance and the results are reported in Section IV.D.
D. Industry Median-Adjusted Operating Performance
Changes in performances can be masked by trends within an industry and to
account for this possibility we use industry median-adjusted measures. Such pro-
cedures have been used previously in China-based research (Firth et al. (2006a))
and in studies elsewhere (Healy et al. (1992), Higson and Elliott (1998)). Industry-
adjusted performance is calculated by subtracting the industry median from the
sample firm performance for each year and firm. Thus,
IAOPit = OPit − OPIt,(2)
where IAOPit is the industry-adjusted operating performance measure for firm i in
year t (t=−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3), OPit is the operating performance measure of firm i
in year t, and OPIt is the industry median operating performance measure in year
t. In constructing the industry median, we omit the control transfer firm.
The industry median-adjusted operating performancemeasures are ROA, OCF,
ROS, AT, CGS, CAPEX, and GRO. Industry median-adjusted employment and
productivity data are not available because the data are incomplete. Industries are
based on the standard industry classifications (SIC) developed by the CSRC.
E. Matched Firm-Adjusted Operating Performance
Following Barber and Lyon (1997) and Ghosh (2001), we also measure per-
formance against firms matched on the basis of industry, performance, and size.
The procedure is as follows. For each sample firm, an industry matched firm is
chosen that is closest in terms of ROA (at the transaction year), and where the
absolute percentage difference is less than 30%. Additionally, the matched firm
must be no more than 100% smaller/larger than the sample firm in terms of mar-
ket value of equity (at the beginning of the transaction year). Of the 156 control
transfer firms, only 129 firms are successfully matched. The potential matches do
not include control transfer firms, and the matched firm can only be chosen once
in a calendar year.
The matched firm-adjusted performance is simply the sample firm perfor-
mance minus the matched firm performance. Thus,
MAOPit = OPit − OPmt,(3)
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where MAOPit is the matched firm-adjusted operating performance measure for
firm i in year t (t=−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3), OPit is the operating performance measure
of firm i in year t, and OPmt is the matched firm operating performance measure
in year t. The matched firm-adjusted operating performance measures are ROA,
OCF, ROS, AT, CGS, CAPEX, and GRO.
IV. Empirical Results
A. Median Changes in Operating Performance
Table 4 reports the median operating performance before and after control
transfers for the whole sample and for the subgroups (state transfers and private
transfers). The raw firm median performance numbers are shown as well as in-
dustry median-adjusted and matched firm-adjusted numbers. The sample size is
slightly smaller for the pre-control transfers as there are more missing data. The
profitability measures (ROA, OCF, and ROS) are quite small and are lower than
the industry median and lower than the matched firm in the pre-transfer period.
Wang and Wong (2003) also report poor firm performance prior to a transfer of
ownership. Firms where ownership control is passed to private companies appear
to have lower profitability than the state transfer group in the pre-transfer period.
For example, the median ROA for private transfers in the two years prior to trans-
fer is 0.52%. By comparison, the median ROA is 1.75% for state transfers. The
evidence indicates that poor profitability is a catalyst for ownership change with
transfers to private firms being used for the very poorest performers.
In the post-transfer period, there is some weak evidence that performance im-
proves relative to the industry median and the matched firm. Thus, even though
the adjusted performance measures are often negative in the three years after con-
trol transfer, they are less negative than the adjusted performance measures in
the two years before the control transfer. Asset turnover and capital investment
ratios are slightly below their benchmarks in the two years prior to control trans-
fer and there is little evidence of improvements in the post-transfer period. For
private transfers, the industry-adjusted and matched firm-adjusted CGS variables
indicate some improvement in efficiency. Sales growth (GRO) shows substantial
increases after control transfers.
Changes in performance are shown in Table 5. The change is computed as
the performance measure after control transfer minus the performance measure
before. Performance measures are industry median adjusted and matched firm
adjusted. The table shows that there is an improvement in ROA and OCF. To il-
lustrate the interpretation of Table 5, we discuss changes in ROA for the all control
transfer sample. There is an improvement in the median firm’s industry-adjusted
ROA of 0.38% from before to after control transfer. Seventy-nine of the 140
firms have an improvement in industry-adjusted ROA and 61 suffer a decline. The
improvement in the matched firm-adjusted ROA is 1.09% and 69 of the 117 firms
show an improvement. Asset turnover (AT) improves after private transfers. Table
5 also shows a reduction in costs (a negative sign on CGS indicates a reduction).
There is a significant increase in growth. Note, however, that the improvements
in profitability, costs, and growth accrue for private transfers, but state transfers
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only record a statistically significant improvement in industry-adjusted growth. In
particular, control transfers to private acquirers result in a significant reduction in
costs and this, of course, leads to an improvement in operating profit (ROA) and
operating cash flows (OCF). The results contrast with Wang and Wong (2003)
who report performance improvements for firms involved in state transfers. Our
results indicate that control transfers to private investors lead to improvements in
firms’ performances whereas state transfers do not.
TABLE 5
Changes in Operating Performance between Post-3 Year Average and Pre-2 Year Average
around Control Transfers for Control Transferred Companies 1996−2000
Table 5 reports changes in industry median-adjusted (IA) and matched firm-adjusted (MA) operating performance be-
tween the post-3 year average and the pre-2 year average for control transferred companies for the whole sample and
for the subgroups. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to examine whether the changes in operating performance be-
tween the post-control transfer period and the pre-control transfer period are statistically significant. The median changes,
the number of positive/negative changes, and the proportion of z-statistics based on positive ranks are reported. The
performance measures reported are “ROA,” “OCF,” “ROS,” “AT,” “CGS,” “CAPEX,” and “GRO.” “ROA” is calculated by
dividing the operating earnings of the firm for the year by the market value of the firm’s assets at the beginning of the year.
Market value of total assets is the sum of the product of stock price and the number of shares issued plus the book value
of debt. “OCF ” refers to operating cash flows, defined as sales minus cost of goods sold, minus selling and administrative
expenses, plus depreciation and amortization expenses, deflated by the market value of the firm’s assets at the beginning
of the year. “ROS” is the operating earnings deflated by the net sales for the year. “AT ” is net sales divided by the average
book value of total assets at the beginning of the year and at the end of the year. “CGS” is the ratio of cost of goods sold
to net sales. “CAPEX” is the capital expenditures divided by the fixed assets at the beginning of the year. “GRO” is the
increase in net sales deflated by the net sales of the previous year. The number of observations available is given in the
column “N.”
All Control Transfers State Transfers Private Transfers
N Median +ve/−ve Prop. z N Median +ve/−ve Prop. z N Median +ve/−ve Prop. z
ROA
IA 140 0.38% 79/61 2.213** 83 0.07% 42/41 0.440 57 0.91% 37/20 2.840***
MA 117 1.09% 69/48 2.920*** 68 −0.10% 33/35 −0.745 49 2.27% 36/13 3.469***
OCF
IA 140 0.68% 81/59 2.375** 83 0.10% 43/40 0.445 57 1.51% 38/19 2.856***
MA 117 1.13% 69/48 2.591*** 68 −0.53% 32/36 −0.269 49 2.36% 37/12 3.576***
ROS
IA 151 −1.12% 72/79 −0.739 91 −1.66% 40/51 −1.183 60 1.40% 32/28 0.140
MA 126 3.60% 75/51 2.675*** 74 0.44% 39/35 1.118 52 13.30% 36/16 2.541***
AT
IA 140 0.020 75/65 1.889* 83 −0.002 41/42 −0.889 57 0.043 34/23 2.086**
MA 117 0.114 69/48 2.131** 68 0.020 36/32 −0.987 49 0.150 33/16 2.154**
CGS
IA 151 −0.021 62/89 −2.292** 91 −0.004 43/48 −0.067 60 −0.041 19/41 −3.291***
MA 126 −0.036 50/76 −2.789*** 74 −0.017 34/40 −1.403 52 −0.076 16/36 −2.377**
CAPEX
IA 140 −0.022 66/74 −0.135 83 −0.003 41/42 −0.145 57 −0.063 25/32 −0.417
MA 116 0.226 71/45 2.430** 67 0.212 40/27 −0.687 49 0.239 31/18 2.770***
GRO
IA 139 9.99% 79/60 3.543*** 82 8.30% 46/39 2.314** 57 17.14% 33/24 2.705***
MA 116 26.51% 77/39 3.163*** 67 18.53% 41/26 1.362 49 28.42% 36/13 3.178***
***, **, and * denote the changes are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test.
The performance changes over the period year −2 to year +3 are shown in
Figure 1. Performance is poorer in the two years before the transfer and improves
in the years after the control transfer. The improvements in performance are more
pronounced for the private transfers. The trend in performance shown in Figure 1
is consistent with the results in Table 5.
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FIGURE 1









































































































B. Employment and Productivity around Control Transfers
One reason why the Chinese central, regional, and local government wanted
to keep a significant ownership stake was so they could influence firms to maintain
employment levels. Given China’s turbulent past and its espousal of socialist
principles, the government is keen to avoid widespread social unrest that would
surely follow if unemployment levels increased dramatically. The state, therefore,
takes a risk in selling its controlling ownership stake to another party, especially
a private entity.
Table 6 shows the change in employment surrounding control transfers for
57 cases where we have employment data for the two years prior to a transfer and
the three years subsequent. The median employment level drops by a statistically
significant 202 employees. The reductions in employees amount to about 17%
of the workforce. Sales per employee and assets per employee increase signifi-
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cantly. Both state transfers and private transfers show reductions in employment
and increases in productivity. The results are consistent with many listed firms
having surplus labor.5 The fact that the state has been willing to relinquish con-
trol of some firms implies they are now willing to accept higher unemployment
levels in the quest to make firms more efficient. The government’s willingness
to allow worker redundancies after control transfers is partly because growth in
the economy has absorbed many of the laid-off workers. Nevertheless, China’s
official unemployment statistics do show an increase in unemployment rates from
the year 2000.
TABLE 6
Employment and Productivity and Changes in Employment and Productivity around Control
Transfers 1996–2000
Table 6 reports employment and productivity and changes in employment and productivity around control transfers. Em-
ployment (EMP) is measured as the number of employees employed by the control transferred firms. Sales per employee
(SEMP) and total assets per employee (AEMP) are used to measure productivity. The pre-2 year averages and post-3 year
averages are reported. The median changes, the number of positive/negative changes, and the proportion of z-statistics
based on positive ranks in the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are also reported. The number of observations available is
reported under the column “N.”
Panel A. Median Employment and Productivity around Control Transfers
All Control State Private
Transfers Transfers Transfers
Pre-2 Post-3 Pre-2 Post-3 Pre-2 Post-3
Year Year Year Year Year Year
Average Average Average Average Average Average
N Median N Median N Median N Median N Median N Median
EMP 57 1.187 155 0.882 35 1.406 94 0.883 22 1.060 61 0.832
(in 1000)
SEMP 57 0.122 155 0.304 35 0.175 94 0.424 22 0.120 61 0.250*
(in RMB million)
AEMP 57 0.341 155 0.911 35 0.342 94 0.841 22 0.338 61 1.179
(in RMB million)
All Control State Private
Transfers Transfers Transfers
N Median +ve/−ve Prop. z N Median +ve/−ve Prop. z N Median +ve/−ve Prop. z
EMP 57 −0.202 16/41 −2.832*** 35 −0.234 10/25 −2.064** 22 −0.162 6/16 −2.127**
(in 1000)
SEMP 57 0.141 46/11 4.771*** 35 0.153 32/3 4.422*** 22 0.037 14/8 1.932*
(in RMB million)
AEMP 57 0.471 55/2 6.328*** 35 0.471 33/2 4.865*** 22 0.379 22/0 4.107***
(in RMB million)
Panel B. Changes in Employment and Productivity around Control Transfers
***, **, and * denote the changes are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test.
C. Sources of Improvement in Operating Performance
In this section, we seek to identify reasons why profitability improves in
some cases of a change in ownership control, but not in others. The factors we ex-
5Chen et al. (2006) show that employment levels do not fall after an IPO listing, even though such
evidence is found in privatizations in other countries. This suggests that maintaining employment
levels is a political imperative. Note that their data are from IPO firms and are prior to any control
transfer.
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amine are whether the buying shareholder has significant ownership prior to con-
trol transfer (Old), whether the selling shareholder retains significant ownership
(Partial), whether a firm has more than one change in ownership in a three-year
period (Multiple), whether the ownership change is accompanied by a change in
CEO (CEOTurnover), and whether the new controlling shareholder changes the
industry focus of the firm (IndustryShift).
A new controlling shareholder who already had an investment stake in the
listed firm may have a different influence on the firm than one who did not. On
the one hand, an old buyer (one who previously had a non-controlling share stake
prior to becoming the controlling owner) might not bring about sufficient changes
that would lead to an improvement in profitability. For example, these investors
might be attracted to the existing business model of the firm. On the other hand,
an existing shareholder which increases its investment to become a controlling
shareholder will have better knowledge of the firm and detailed ideas and plans
about how to improve performance.
A partial sale might have a negative impact on changes in profitability be-
cause the formerly largest shareholder may interfere with the reorganization plans
of the new controlling shareholder. In the case of partial sales, the fact that the
seller (the seller is always an agency of the state or city or municipality) keeps
some ownership rights implies the seller wants to retain some influence over the
firm. We expect multiple changes of ownership will have a negative impact on
profitability because of uncertainty in policy making and changes in strategic de-
cisions. A change in CEO is expected to be associated with improved profitability
as the new controlling shareholder installs a new and better management team.
We examine whether a change in industry focus (industry shift) will be for
the better. The classification of industry follows the CSRC document, Guidance
on Listed Firms’ Industries, issued on April 3, 2001. There are altogether 13 in-
dustries coded from A, Agriculture, to M, Conglomerates. There are 10 subindus-
tries under C, Manufacturing industry. We classify all the listed firms into 22
industries as we treat the 10 subindustries under manufacturing as distinct indus-
tries. Therefore, a shift in industry is defined as a move from one industry to
another. Following publication of the Guidance, the two stock exchanges and the
CSRC issued the industry classifications to all the listed firms in 2001. We use
the industry classifications for 2001 data, and extrapolate backward based on a
detailed analysis of each firm. Finally, we add Size as a control variable.
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 7. In 12.18% of the cases, buyers
have an ownership stake in the firm prior to the control transfer and in 6.41%
of cases the ownership is significant (10% or more—but not a controlling stake).
Prior ownership stakes are more common in state transfers. Table 7 shows that
in 50% of the cases the state maintains some ownership interest in the firm after
it disposes of its controlling stake. In 32.05% of the cases, the seller retains a
significant minority ownership stake of 10% or more after the control transfer.
In another 17.95% of the cases (50% minus 32.05%), the seller retains a small
ownership presence. The seller is more likely to retain an ownership stake after
a private transfer although the stake is quite small (in only 29.03% of the cases
is the seller’s minority ownership greater than 10%). Multiple transfers occur in
about 7% of the cases.
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TABLE 7
Characteristics of Control Transfers, CEO Turnover, and Industry Shifts Following Control
Transfers for China’s Control Transferred Listed Companies 1996–2000
Table 7 reports the characteristics of control transfers, CEO turnover, and industry shifts following control transfers during
1996–2000. Transaction characteristics are whether the buyer holds an ownership stake before control transfer, whether
the buyer’s ownership before control transfer is greater than 10%, whether the seller retains ownership after control transfer,
and whether the seller retains a greater than 10% ownership stake after control transfer. “Multiple Transfers” refer to com-
panies that changed their controlling shareholders more than once in three years. “CEO Turnover” refers to cases where
control transfer companies replace their CEOs in the transaction year or in the year following the transaction. “Industry
Shifts” refers to cases where control transfer companies change their industry classification after control transfers.
All Control State Private
Transfers Transfers Transfers
(N = 56) (N = 94) (N = 62)
Buyer Holds Ownership before CT 19 12.18% 15 15.96% 4 6.45%
Buyer’s Ownership before CT > 10% 10 6.41% 7 7.45% 3 4.84%
Seller Retains Ownership 79 50.64% 44 46.81% 35 56.45%
Seller Retains > 10% Ownership 50 32.05% 32 34.04% 18 29.03%
Multiple Transfers 12 7.69% 7 7.44% 5 8.06%
CEO Turnover 118 75.64% 69 73.40% 49 79.03%
Industry Shifts 38 24.36% 21 22.34% 17 27.42%
In about 75% of the cases, the CEO is replaced when there is a change in the
controlling shareholder; the turnover is higher for private transfers (79%) than for
state transfers (73%). The rate of CEO turnover is much higher than normal; Firth,
Fung, and Rui (2006b) calculate the normal turnover rate for Chinese firms to be
34% (and this rate is quite high by international standards). The short tenure of
the CEO is a function of many things. The legal term of appointment is three years
although the CEO is often reappointed. One reason for the term of appointment
being just three years is that the government does not want managers to become
entrenched as this could lead to more fraud. CEO turnover increases substantially
after a control transfer.
An industry shift occurs in more than 24% of transfers. Change in industry
focus is higher for private transfers (27% for private transfers and 22% for state
transfers). One reason for this is that in some cases the private investor’s existing
business interests are in a different industry, but they are nevertheless injected into
the listed firm and this causes a shift in industry focus.
To examine the impact of the above factors on changes in profitability, we
develop a regression model as follows:
ΔIAROAi(or ΔMAROAi) = α0 + α1Oldi + α2Partiali + α3Multiplei(4)
+ α4CEOTurnoveri + α5IndustryShifti + α6 log(Size)i + εi.
The two measures of profitability are ΔIAROA and ΔMAROA. ΔIAROA is
the difference in industry median-adjusted ROA from before (prior two years) to
after (subsequent three years) the control transfer, and ΔMAROA is the differ-
ence in matched firm-adjusted ROA from before (prior two years) to after (sub-
sequent three years) the control transfer. Old is a dummy variable coded 1 for
control transfers in which the buyer originally holds greater than 10% ownership
before control transfer and 0 otherwise. Partial is a dummy variable coded 1 for
control transfers in which the seller retains greater than 10% ownership and 0
otherwise. Multiple is a dummy variable coded 1 for transactions that are pre-
ceded or followed by another control transfer within three years and 0 otherwise.
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CEOTurnover is a dummy variable coded 1 for control transfers in which CEOs
are replaced in the transaction year or in the following year and 0 otherwise.
IndustryShift is a dummy variable coded 1 for firms that change their industry and
0 otherwise. We measure industry shift by examining whether the industry code
(SIC) for a firm changes after control transfers. Finally, log(Size) is added as a
control variable and is calculated as the logarithmic transformation of the market
value of the control transferred firm at the beginning of the transaction year. Year
and industry dummy variables are included as controls.
The results of the regressions are shown in Table 8. An old buyer is nega-
tively related with improvement in profitability for state transfers, but is positively
related for private transfers (using industry-adjusted performance). This suggests
that a private investor who has a prior stake in the firm is in a better position to
effect performance improvement after control transfer (the prior stake means the
private investor has existing knowledge of the business). In contrast, a firm’s per-
formance deteriorates after a state transfer when the new controlling shareholder
has a prior investment stake. Partial is not significant and so whether the seller
retains a significant investment stake in the firm does not have an impact on the
change in profitability. Multiple is not significant. A change in CEO has a sta-
tistically significant positive impact on profitability in five of the six regressions.
An industry shift is positively associated with improvements in profitability for
private transfers. Finally, log(Size) has negative and significant associations with
profitability. This suggests that it is more difficult to improve the performance of
large firms.
Fan et al. (2005) recently examined corporate pyramids in China, where the
ultimate controlling investor holds investments via a number of subsidiaries and
intermediaries, and then focus on why pyramids exist. We extend this line of
enquiry6 to examine if performance change (ΔIAROA, ΔMAROA) is associated
with the number of pyramid layers (and the change in the number of layers).
However, we do not find any significant association between corporate pyramids
and changes in financial performance for the control transfer firms.
D. The Impact of Control Transfer on Stock Market Prices
In this section, we investigate whether the stock market attaches importance
to control transfers. Studies in the U.S. and elsewhere (e.g., Barclay and Holder-
ness (1991), Franks and Mayer (2001)) have shown that control transfers do have
an impact on the stock prices of the companies concerned. Control transfers can
be value enhancing or value destroying (Bebchuk (1994)). Value enhancement
occurs when the new controlling shareholder brings superior management to the
firm. Alternatively, the new controlling owner might use its power to exploit the
firm and expropriate assets. The results in earlier tables suggest that control trans-
fers in China are not value destroying in terms of profitability, but further evidence
can be gleaned from examining stock returns.
We examine abnormal stock returns (ARs) for the 120 days surrounding an
announcement of a control transfer. Abnormal returns are calculated as the differ-
6We thank the reviewer for suggesting this analysis.
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TABLE 8
OLS Regression Analysis of the Change in Performance for Control Transferred Firms
1996–2000
The Model: ΔIAROAi (or ΔMAROAi ) = α0 + α1Oldi + α2Partiali + α3Multiplei
+ α4CEOTurnoveri + α5IndustryShifti + α6 log(Size)i + εi .
ΔIAROA is the difference in industry median-adjusted operating ROAs between the post-3 year average and the pre-2
year average. ΔMAROA is the difference in matched firm-adjusted operating ROAs between the post-3 year average and
the pre-2 year average. Old is a dummy variable coded 1 for control transfers where the buyer originally holds a 10% (or
greater) ownership stake before control transfer and 0 otherwise. Partial is a dummy variable coded 1 for control transfers
where the seller retains no less than a 10% ownership stake in the control transferred firms and 0 otherwise. Multiple
is a dummy variable coded 1 for those companies that changed their controlling shareholders more than once during 3
years and 0 otherwise. CEOTurnover is a dummy variable coded 1 for control transfers where CEOs are replaced in the
transaction year or in the year following the transaction and 0 otherwise. IndustryShift is a dummy variable coded 1 for
control transfer firms that change their industry classification following control transfers and 0 otherwise. log(Size) is the
log of beginning market value of equity for control transferred firms.
Dependent Variable: ΔIAROA Dependent Variable: ΔMAROA
Independent Predicted All State Private All State Private
Variable Signs Transfers Transfers Transfers Transfers Transfers Transfers
Constant ? 0.343 0.352 0.435 0.372 0.453 0.420
(0.000) (0.001) (0.024) (0.010) (0.017) (0.124)
Old ? –0.006 –0.029 0.037 0.003 –0.012 0.030
(0.606) (0.040) (0.088) (0.844) (0.594) (0.280)
Partial – –0.008 –0.005 –0.005 –0.004 –0.005 0.002
(0.179) (0.424) (0.639) (0.641) (0.714) (0.879)
Multiple – –0.008 –0.010 0.003 –0.000 –0.009 0.012
(0.171) (0.150) (0.757) (0.997) (0.482) (0.368)
CEOTurnover + 0.021 0.019 0.025 0.026 0.019 0.033
(0.002) (0.031) (0.032) (0.024) (0.236) (0.048)
IndustryShift + 0.013 –0.002 0.032 0.023 –0.004 0.053
(0.053) (0.778) (0.004) (0.042) (0.787) (0.001)
log(Size) – –0.039 –0.039 –0.050 –0.042 –0.050) –0.049
(0.000) (0.001) (0.020) (0.007) (0.015) (0.107)
Obs. 140 83 57 117 68 49
Model F -Statistics 7.623 6.080 3.670 4.311 1.991 3.599
Adjusted R2 0.222 0.271 0.222 0.146 0.081 0.245
p-value for the coefficients are reported in brackets. Bold signifies a significant coefficient at the 0.10 level or better.
ence between the actual returns and the industry (or matched firm) returns,7 that
is:
ARiτ = Riτ − Rˆiτ ,(5)
where ARiτ is the abnormal return for firm i on day τ , Riτ is the return with
dividend reinvestment for firm i on day τ , and Rˆτ is the industry (or matched
firm) return with cash dividend reinvestment on day τ . The cumulative abnormal




ARiτ − 60 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ 60,(6)




7The mean returns and market model approaches are also used to calculate ARs. The results are
similar to those for the industry- and matched firm-adjusted approaches and so we just show the latter
results.
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As described above, we use two benchmarks in calculating abnormal returns
(one based on the industry average and the other based on the matched firm).
Returns data come from the CSMAR database. We have sufficient returns data
for 156 control transfers (using the industry benchmark) and 129 control transfers
(using the matched firm benchmark). The results are shown in Table 9.
TABLE 9
Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns (CARs) (Industry- and Matched Firm-Adjusted) over
Various Intervals from Day −60 to Day +60 Surrounding the First Announcement of Control
Transfers of China’s Listed Companies 1996–2000
Table 9 reports the cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) over various intervals from day−60 to day +60 surrounding
the first announcement of control transfers of China’s listed companies for the whole sample and for the subgroups.
Matched firm-adjusted abnormal stock returns are calculated using the event firm returnminus the correspondingmatched
firm return. The industry-adjusted abnormal returns are calculated using the event firm return minus the corresponding
industry median return. The return data come from CSMAR. The stock returns used are the daily returns with cash
dividend reinvestment. The industry-adjusted firm sample includes 156 control transfers, 94 of which are state transfers
and 62 are private transfers. The matched firm sample includes 129 control transfers, 76 of which are state transfers and
53 are private transfers.
Days in Relation to Control Transfer Announcement
−60 to−1 0 −60 to 0 1 to 60 −60 to 60
IA MA IA MA IA MA IA MA IA MA
All Control Transfers
CARs (%) 17.68% 14.20% 0.31% −0.22% 17.99% 13.99% 4.85% 0.12% 22.84% 14.10%
t-Statistics 11.785*** 6.040*** 1.432 −0.710 11.806*** 5.899*** 3.410*** 0.049 8.098*** 4.223***
% Positive 78.87% 67.44% 53.90% 49.61% 75.44% 66.67% 60.69% 51.16% 70.72% 65.89%
State Transfers
CARs (%) 18.22% 14.19% 0.27% −0.03% 18.49% 14.16% 2.53% −1.33% 21.02% 12.83%
t-Statistics 8.334*** 4.657*** 1.030 −0.073 8.331*** 4.609*** 3.622*** −0.108 7.667*** 3.197***
% Positive 76.77% 67.11% 57.61% 54.67% 75.87% 65.79% 58.79% 48.68% 69.87% 68.42%
Private Transfers
CARs (%) 16.88% 14.18% 0.36% −0.48% 17.24% 13.70% 7.82% 1.80% 25.06% 15.50%
t-Statistics 5.207*** 3.655*** 0.976 −0.959 5.240*** 3.502*** 3.321*** 0.207 7.136*** 2.633***
% Positive 79.44% 67.92% 48.39% 42.31% 76.77% 67.92% 61.10% 54.72% 71.71% 62.26%
*** indicates the returns are statistically significant at the 1% level.
The overall CAR from day−60 to day +60 is a statistically significant 22.84%
(using IA) and 14.10% (using MA); these compare to 16% returns for negotiated
block trades in the U.S. during the 1980s as reported by Barclay and Holder-
ness (1991). Both types of transfer show significant increases in stock prices al-
though the magnitudes vary from 21.02% (12.83%) for state transfers to 25.06%
(15.50%) for transfers to private firms using the industry (matched firm) bench-
mark. While, on average, the CARs are positive, about 30% to 35% of transfers
have negative ARs. The results from Table 9 show that most of the gains occur in
the run-up to the announcement (day −60 to day −1) and the actual announce-
ment has little incremental impact. The positive ARs indicate the stock market
believes that control transfers benefit the owners of tradable shares. Berkman et
al. (2003) also examine stock returns to firms that have a new state owner. They
report significant gains of 7.5% over the 30 days up to the control transfer and this
is less than one-half the gains we find. Like us, they find most of the gain occurs
prior to the announcement of the transfer. The strong positive returns suggest that
the minority shareholders (who own the tradable shares) gain on the transfer of
control. The evidence is consistent with investors believing that a firm’s assets
will not be expropriated away by the new controlling shareholder.
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We also calculate longer-term returns up to 36 months after the transfer. The








where BHRit is the buy and hold returns for firm i in period t, and t represents
month(s) after control transfers, t = 1, 2, . . . , 36. Rit is the monthly return with
cash dividend reinvestment for firm i in month t, and Mt is either the industry
return with cash dividend reinvestment in the corresponding month t or the market
return with cash dividend reinvestment in the corresponding month t.
The results are shown in Table 10. Significant and positive buy and hold
returns (BHRs) are earned by investors in the three years after control transfer.
However, the highest market-adjusted returns occur for private transfers and the
mean (0.6028) is double that of state transfers (0.2842). The industry-adjusted re-
sults also show higher returns for private transfers (0.8550) than for state transfers
(0.5257). The results from Table 10 indicate the positive stock returns associated
with control transfers are maintained in the three years after the transaction.
TABLE 10
Adjusted Buy and Hold Returns Following Control Transfers
Table 10 reports the summary statistics for cumulative buy and hold returns of control transferred firms for up to 3 years










BHRit is the buy and hold returns for firm i in period t. t represents month(s) after control transfers, therefore
t = 1, 2, . . . , 36. Rit is monthly return for firm i in month t. Indext is the reference return in the corresponding month t;
the reference return is industry median return and market return.
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Industry Adj. Market Adj. Industry Adj. Market Adj. Industry Adj. Market Adj.
All Control Transfers
N 156 129 156 129 156 129
Mean 0.2534 0.1638 0.5240 0.3413 0.6566 0.4108
t-Statistics 5.135*** 3.284*** 6.067*** 3.957*** 5.406*** 3.406***
Median 0.1083 0.0216 0.3198 0.1504 0.2618 0.0624
z-Statistics 4.949*** 1.989** 7.343*** 4.075*** 7.001*** 2.475**
State Transfers
N 94 76 94 76 94 76
Mean 0.1978 0.1121 0.3924 0.2230 0.5257 0.2842
t-Statistics 3.695*** 2.141** 5.948*** 3.464*** 4.760*** 2.652***
Median 0.1081 0.0178 0.2623 0.1246 0.1930 0.0205
z-Statistics 3.697*** 1.299 5.232*** 2.800*** 4.776*** 1.310
Private Transfers
N 62 53 62 53 62 53
Mean 0.3377 0.2421 0.7235 0.5208 0.8551 0.6028
t-Statistics 3.609*** 2.498** 3.785*** 2.704*** 3.353*** 2.356**
Median 0.1137 0.0226 0.3864 0.2150 0.3605 0.1038
z-Statistics 3.285*** 1.560 5.143*** 3.032*** 5.101*** 2.359**
*** and ** denote the changes are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
In order to see if the stock returns are associated with changes in industry
median-adjusted profitability, we run the following simple regression model:
CARi(or BHRi) = γ0 + γ1ΔIAROAi(or ΔMAROAi) + vi,(8)
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where CARi is the CAR from day −60 to day +60 for firm i, and CAR repre-
sents the industry-adjusted returns or the matched firm-adjusted returns. BHRi is
the buy and hold return in the 36 months following control, and BHR represents
the industry-adjusted returns or the matched firm-adjusted returns. ΔIAROAi
(ΔMAROAi) is the difference in IAROA (MAROA) between the post-control trans-
fer period and the pre-control transfer period for firm i.
The regression results are reported in Table 11. As the table shows, the
coefficient on ΔIAROA (ΔMAROA) is significantly positive at the 0.01 level when
regressed on BHR, but is insignificantly positive when regressed on CAR. Based
on the CAR regression results, the evidence suggests that individual investors are
unable to successfully anticipate changes in operating performance due to control
transfers. However, the long-run stock market performance does reflect a firm’s
operating performance (as it unfolds).
TABLE 11
Regression of the Improvement in Operating Performance with Announcement Period
Returns from Control Transfers and Long-Term Buy and Hold Returns
The Model: Returnsi = γ0 + γ1ΔIAROAi (or ΔMAROAi ) + vi .
Returnsi is measured both by CARs and BHRs. The CARs are industry-adjusted and matched firm-adjusted cumulative
abnormal returns from day −60 to day +60. BHRs are the buy and hold returns adjusted by industry and matched
firm returns over 36 months following control transfers. ΔIAROAi (ΔMAROAi ) is the difference between the post-3 year
average IAROA (MAROA) and the pre-2 year average IAROA (MAROA) for firm i. IAROA (MAROA) is the firm’s ROA after
subtracting the industry median ROA (matched firm ROA) for the year.
Dependent Predicted Industry- Matched Firm- Industry- Matched Firm-
Variable Sign Adjusted CAR Adjusted CAR Adjusted BHR Adjusted BHR
Constant ? 0.512 0.135 0.530 −0.125
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.282)
ΔIAROA + 0.357 8.362
(0.637) (0.003)
ΔMAROA + 0.116 9.001
(0.869) (0.001)
Obs. 140 117 140 117
Model F -Statistics 0.223 0.270 9.387 16.413
Adjusted R2 −0.002 −0.008 0.057 0.117
p-values for the coefficients are reported in brackets. Bold signifies a significant coefficient at the 0.10 level or better.
E. Returns to Controlling Shareholders
Table 9 shows that control transfers lead to significant increases in stock
returns in the 120 days surrounding the announcement of the transfer and Table 10
shows these gains are maintained in the three years after the transaction. However,
these returns are mainly of interest to the owners of the tradable shares. The new
controlling shareholders own non-tradable shares and if they want to sell their
stakes in the future (if the then prevailing policies remained in place) they will
receive a price that has some small premium to the net asset value (see footnote
2). The new controlling shareholders, therefore, have incentives to maximize net
asset value per share and dividends. With this objective in mind, we calculate the
returns to controlling shareholders based on changes in net asset values and net
asset value plus dividends.
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Our results show that the changes in net assets per share and net assets per
share plus dividends are quite small in the three years after the control transfer.8
For state transfers, the mean and median returns (change in net asset value plus
dividends) over the post-transfer period are positive but not significant. For private
transfers, the means are positive, medians are negative, but none is statistically
significant. Thus, the control transfers do not appear to create much wealth for
the new controlling shareholders.
Given that changes in net assets and dividends yield poor returns, we con-
sider whether there are other sources of gain for the new controlling shareholder.
The new controlling shareholder may be able to reap rewards via synergies or
inter-company transactions that benefit the controlling shareholder’s other busi-
nesses and investments. However, as we do not have access to the financial state-
ments of the new controlling shareholder’s other business interests, we cannot
examine whether the control transfer has led to synergies and efficiencies in the
other businesses. Moreover, unraveling the connected or related party transac-
tions is very difficult and so we do not attempt to quantify gains that might accrue
to the controlling shareholder from these transactions. In extreme cases, the new
controlling shareholder may even expropriate assets from the firm although this
risks severe penalties if the shareholder is detected and prosecuted (Chen, Firth,
Gao, and Rui (2005)).
New controlling shareholders may also be motivated by the hope that their
shares would one day become tradable so they could be sold on the stock market at
the prevailingmarket price. This could yield significant returns as the market price
is typically several times higher than the transfer price (see Table 2). This hope
has become reality as China now allows (and, indeed, encourages) the conversion
of untradable shares to tradable (or listed) shares. We describe the conversion
process below.
In 2001, the government introduced a plan to sell off the state’s remaining
shares in listed firms (the so-called second stage of privatization), but this was
shelved after strong protests from private investors (those who owned the listed
shares). The private investors were concerned that the sale of state shares would
flood the market and stock prices would plummet. In 2005, the government resur-
rected the plan to sell state shares in listed firms and made the plan more palatable
for private investors by prohibiting new IPOs for one year (thereby reducing the
supply of new shares) and requiring firms to reach agreements with the holders
of listed shares to “compensate” them. The compensation is in the form of the
owners of the state and legal shares giving some of those shares (for free) to the
existing owners of the listed shares. Other forms of compensation include the
firm giving bonus shares, warrants, and cash (in the form of a special dividend)
exclusively to the owners of the tradable shares.
The exact formula for the conversion of a specific firm’s non-tradable shares
depends on the negotiations with the owners of the tradable shares. By mid-2006,
about 70% of firms had completed negotiations and reached agreements with the
private investors. On average, the compensation reduces the controlling owner’s
stake by about 20%. The new tradable shares (the former state and legal shares)
8The detailed results are available from the authors.
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are subject to a lock-up period and they cannot be sold on the stock market before
the end of 2006 (and even later for some companies). The agreements to convert
the non-tradable shares into tradable shares has not had a major impact on stock
prices, and so it appears that the new controlling shareholders will be able to
realize gains if they sell their shares after the end of the lock-up period. Because
the earliest lock-up period does not expire until the end of 2006, there have been
no cases so far of the controlling shareholders selling their shares into the stock
market.
If the new controlling shareholder buys in the hope that the shares will one
day become tradable, the realized stock returns will depend on the government
changing its policy, the number of years before the change takes place, the share
price at the time of conversion, and any penalties or costs to convert. All these
factors are unknown at the time of the control transfer.
In Table 12, we show the returns to the new controlling shareholders under
the assumption that the shares will become tradable after T years (T = 1, 5, 10,
15) and that the share price at time T is 50%, 80%, 100%, 125%, and 150% of the
price at the date of the transfer (T = 0).9 Our research method is similar to that
of Chen and Xiong (2001). The transfer price is set as 0.27 of the market price
at the date of transfer as this reflects the average discount of 73%. We ignore
dividends as only one-quarter of firms pay dividends and the average dividend
yield (of those firms paying dividends) is 0.72% (Chen and Xiong (2001)). We
also do not consider the cost to convert the tradable shares. Based on the evidence
to date, it appears that the compensation is about 20%, but the relative share price
in the left-hand column of Table 12 has not been reduced to reflect this cost.
TABLE 12
Investment Returns to Controlling Shareholders under Various Assumptions of Holding
Period and Market Price
Table 12 shows the annual returns to controlling shareholders who buy at a 73% discount to the market value (at T = 0)
and sell T years later when the market price has risen (up to 150%) or fallen (down to 50%).
Share Price at Time of Annual Returns to Controlling
Conversion to Tradable Shares Shareholders if Conversion Takes
as a Percentage of the Price at Place in T Years after Transfer
T = 0 T = 1 T = 5 T = 10 T = 15
50% 85.2% 13.1% 6.4% 4.2%
80% 196.3% 24.3% 11.5% 7.5%
100% 270.4% 29.9% 14.0% 9.2%
125% 363.0% 35.9% 16.6% 10.8%
150% 455.6% 40.9% 18.7% 12.2%
To illustrate the calculations in Table 12, if an investor buys a controlling
stake at the average discount of 73% (i.e., 27% of the then market price) and the
shares become tradable 10 years later (T =10) and the market price (at T =10) is
80% of the market price at T = 0, the investor will earn a return of 196.3% (i.e.,
(80/27)− 1) over the 10-year period. This is equivalent to an annualized return
9Share prices are quite volatile. The Shanghai A-share index doubled from 1997 to 2001 (the
peak) and it subsequently declined 50%. At the beginning of 2006, the index (1163) was similar to the
index at the end of 1998 (1201). The Shenzhen A-share has followed a similar pattern. Share prices
increased sharply in 2006 and 2007.
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of 11.5% (this is shown in Table 12, T = 10, market price = 80%). Note that the
80% of market price corresponds to the share price remaining the same, but the
controlling shareholder paying compensation of 20% (see the earlier discussion
on the average compensation). Table 12 shows quite high returns when the share
price increases and/or the conversion period is short (T < 6). Under the worst
case scenario (share price is 50% of the price at T = 0, conversion is at T = 15),
the annualized return is 4.2% (and this drops to 2.7% if the controlling shareholder
has to give up 20% of its shares to the existing tradable shareholders).
The stock returns to controlling shareholders, if the shares eventually become
tradable, depend in part on the discount when they buy the shares. A question
arises as to whether the discounts are reasonable. Longstaff (1995) derives a
formula for the upper bounds on discounts for shares that do not trade for T years.
The model requires inputs for T and for the volatility of a liquid but otherwise























where N(·) is the cumulative normal distribution function, σ2 is the variance of
returns, and T is the illiquidity period.
We use the Longstaff model to see if it helps explain the discounts for our
sample of control transfers. We use the variance of monthly returns in the follow-
ing one year after the event year to calculate σ2, and T = 1 to 10. For each event
firm, we can estimate its Discounts ub from T = 1 to T = 10. Figure 2 shows the
means and medians of the discounts.
FIGURE 2
























As the controlling shareholders cannot anticipate the restriction period (and,
indeed, there is no guarantee that the shares would ever be converted), a long
period T should be used. We find that if T=15, the upper bound of the theoretical
discount rate is about 43%–50% (see Figure 2). Given that the cost of conversion
is approximately 20%, it appears that the sum of the two costs (cost of liquidity
and the cost of conversion) is close to the observed discount of 73%. In light of
this simulation analysis, the observed discounts seem reasonable.
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V. Conclusions
China’s modern enterprise reforms are meant to revitalize industry and cre-
ate strong and vibrant companies that do not need support from the state. Un-
fortunately, these fine aspirations have not been met, and corporate profitability
and efficiency have declined (Chen et al. (1999)). The continued high govern-
ment ownership has been blamed for these shortcomings. The state itself has
recognized the impediments present in large government ownership and, since
the mid-1990s, has allowed control transfers in China’s listed firms.
Our results show that there is an improvement in performance after a transfer
of ownership control, but only when the new owner is a non-state entity. A major
source of improvement occurs through cost reduction, including a fall in labor
costs. Transfers that are made within state entities do not record significant im-
provements in operating performance. When we examine stock returns, we find
the stock market responds positively to the event, but higher returns occur when
transfers are made to private firms. In most cases, transfers of control are associ-
ated with a change in the CEO. Here, the new principal shareholder brings in a
new management team. In some cases, there is a major restructuring of the firm
and it moves into another industry sector. Frequent changes in ownership impede
a firm’s performance because of instability.
Our study adds to the literature on China’s enterprise reform program. One
implication of our results is that further reduction of state ownership is needed if
the full fruits of the reforms are to be felt. Ownership change per se is not enough
to generate substantial improvement. What is needed is a transfer of ownership to
private investors (individuals, firms, or organizations). Our results are consistent
with the research of Alchain (1965), Shleifer (1998), and Green (2004), all of
whom argue that private ownership is superior to state ownership. Based on our
results, transferring ownership control to private hands will enhance economic
efficiency and increase corporate profitability. Our results also suggest that China
needs an active market for corporate control.
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